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Abstract
We hypothesize that the spread of the Internet has reduced corruption, chiey through two mech-
anisms. First, the Internet facilitates the dissemination of information about corrupt behavior, which
raises the detection risks to shady bureaucrats and politicians. Second, the Internet has reduced the
interface between bureaucrats and the public. Using cross-country data and data for the U.S. states, we
test this hypothesis. Data spans the period during which the Internet has been in operation. In order to
address the potential endogeneity problem, we develop a novel identication strategy for Internet di¤u-
sion. Digital equipment is highly sensitive to power disruption: it leads to equipment failure and damage.
Even very short disruptions (less than 1/60th of a second) can have such consequences. Accordingly,
more frequent power failures will increase the user cost of IT capital; either directly, through depreciation,
or indirectly, through the costs of protective devises. Ceteris paribus, we expect that higher IT user costs
will lower the speed of Internet di¤usion. A natural phenomenon which causes a major part of annual
power disruptions globally is lightning activity. Lightning therefore provides exogenous variation in the
user cost of IT capital. Based on global satellite data from the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), we construct lightning density data for a large cross section of countries and for
the U.S. states. We demonstrate that the lightning density variable is a strong instrument for changes in
Internet penetration; and we proceed to show that the spread of the Internet has reduced the extent of
corruption across the globe and across the U.S. The size of the impact is economically and statistically
signicant.
Keywords: Public corruption; Internet; Information
JEL Classication codes: K4; O1; H0
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1 Introduction
Corruption is commonly perceived to be a major stumbling block for many poor countries in their struggle to
prosper. Aside from retarding growth (Mauro, 1995), corruption entails scal leakage, which reduces the
ability of poor countries to supply public services like schooling and health care (e.g., Reinikka and Svensson,
2004). As a consequence, it is a government failure one would like to dispose of.
However, combating corruption is not an easy task. In theory, it is possible to o¤er government o¢ cials
high powered contracts, which would make it too expensive to be caught taking bribes for it to be worth the
risk. In practice, such course of action is rarely feasible in many poor countries due to its high cost. The
marginal costs of being corrupt, as percieved by the civil servant, can also be increased by elevating the risk
of detection. Unfortunately, this too can be a costly route to take as it requires considerable expenses to run
an e¤ective judicial system. More importantly, it may be di¢ cult to nd incorruptible o¢ cials to track down
the corrupt ones. If the controllers are corrupt the consequences for bureaucrats of taking bribes are reduced,
since the latter may avoid prosecution by bribing the former. In theory, this strategic complementarity in
corruption leads to multiple equilibria, and it motivates why the corruption scourge can be hard to combat.1
The present paper provides evidence showing that the spread of the Internet has reduced the extent of
corruption during the 1990s and early years of the 21st century.2 A major reason why the Internet has had
such an e¤ect is very likely to be found in its role as a provider of information. By providing information
about corrupt o¢ cials the risk of detection rises. Likewise, a more freely owing stream of information
may also increase the risks to politicians of taking bribes; if the public is informed about corrupt behavior
the re-election chances of shady politicians tend to diminish (Ferraz and Finan, 2008). There is by now
considerable informal evidence to suggest that the Internet serves such purposes.
The New York Times (May 24, 2005) reports on the self-appointed Chinese investigative journalist, Li
Xinde, who maintains an anti-corruption Web site targeting o¢ cial corruption in China.3 This journalist
travels around China with a laptop and a digital camera investigating o¢ cial wrongdoing. He then writes
about it on his Web site, making sure to leave town before local authorities can arrest him. The Web site
has been instrumental in exposing a corruption case involving the deputy mayor of Jining, a large Chinese
city. The site featured an investigative report and a series of photos showing the deputy mayor kneeling and
crying, begging not to be reported to the police. The deputy mayor was subsequently arrested.4
1See Bardhan (1997) and Aidt (2003) for very useful surveys.
2Technically there is a distinction to be made between the Internet and the World Wide Web (WWW). The latter was
launched in 1991 by CERN (the European Organisation for Nuclear Research), whereas the history of the Internetarguably
is much older. See Hobbes Internet Timeline v8.2 <http://www.zakon.org/robert/internet/timeline/>. In this paper, we
dene the Internet/WWW as the network of networks using the TCP/IP/HTTP protocols, which was spawned by the launch
of WWW.
3Death by a Thousand Blogs by Nicholas D. Kristof. The Washington Post (May 2, 2007) also ran a (di¤erent) story
featuring Li Xinde exposing corruption in China.
4Another fascinating story from China concerns the village of Shengyou in Hebei Province, which saw a clash between village
peasants and numerous armed thugs sent by property developers to grab their land. A video smuggled out by one of the villagers
shows his fellow residents being beaten with staves and shovels. Six villagers were killed and around 50 were wounded. With
copies of the video circulating the Internet, the authorities reacted promptly: A mayor and a Communist Party chief of the
municipality to which the village belongs were sacked. The o¢ cial media reported that 22 people had been arrested, including
the bosses of a rm contracted by a local state-owned power plant to build a waste-processing plant on the village elds. See
Turning ploughshares into staves, The Economist (June 23, 2005).
2
A few years ago the Indian news Web site <http://www.Tehelka.com> nearly toppled the Indian gov-
ernment after documenting high-level corruption. The reporters posed as arms dealers and documented
negotiations with top politicians and bureaucrats over the size of required side payments to get the order:
in some instances the reporters even got the delivery of the bribe on camera. Consequently, numerous
politicians and top o¢ cials had to resign, chief among them the defence minister George Fernandes.5
In 2004 judge John Gomery was heading a commission investigating a kickback program in which
the Canadian Liberal government had given C$ 85 million to Montreal-based advertising rms. The
funds were intended to be used for publicizing certain government programs, but were apparently in-
stead funneled to political allies. While the hearings were public, the judge banned the o¢ cial media
from publishing reports on what was being uncovered until a nal ruling was made. The o¢ cial media
respected the ban but a Canadian blogger was able to bypass it by collaborating with a U.S. based Web site
<http://www.captainsquartersblog.com>.6 The ensuing public anger from what was disseminated through
the Web site probably cost the Liberals their parliamentary majority in the June 2004 election.7
The Internet has likely also worked to reduce corruption through a slightly di¤erent channel. That is,
the WWW is the main vehicle for the provision e-government worldwide; in the U.S., for instance, more
than 80% of all e-government is Internet based (West, 2005).8 E-government can reduce corruption in
two principal ways. First, by allowing citizens to directly access government services online, e-government
obviates bureaucratsrole as intermediaries between the government and the public, thus reducing the number
of interactions between potentially corrupt o¢ cials and the public. Second, by digitalizingthe provision of
government services, e-government reduces bureaucratic discretion (thereby curbing some opportunities for
arbitrary action) and it increases transparency, which ultimately leads to more accountability. In particular,
e-government may elevate chances of exposure by keeping detailed data on transactions, making it possible
to track and link the corrupt with their wrongful acts.
The potential importance of e-government is also backed by much informal evidence (see Wescott, 2003;
Global Corruption Report, 2003). In Pakistan, for instance, the entire tax department has introduced ICT
systems with the stated purpose of reducing contact between tax collectors and tax payers. In the Philippines,
the Department of Budget and Management has established an on-line e-procurement system that allows
public bidding for suppliers. This system has increased transparency in transactions. In South Korea, the
Online Procedures Enhancement for Civil Applications allows ordinary citizens to monitor applications for
permits or approvals where corruption is most likely to take place; it also allows questions to be raised in
case irregularities are detected. In the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, where 40% of its 76 million people
cannot read, 214 deed registration o¢ ces have been fully computerized. This has made the process of deed
registration easy and transparent. The process started in April 1998 and by February 2000 about 700,000
documents had been registered. Before the introduction of online registration, opaqueness of procedures
forced citizens to employ middlemen who used corrupt practices to obtain services. In several Asian countries,
5See The Sting That Has India Writhingby Celia W. Dugger, The New York Times (March 16, 2001).
6See Shivering Mr Martins timbers, The Economist (April 7, 2004).
7See also Did blogosphere inuence vote? Corruption inquiry covered only on Web might have tipped Canadian election
by David Kopel, The Rocky Mountain News (January 28, 2006).
8 In Britain, Directgov, an o¢ cial Webpage launced in 2004, aims to contain the entire British government in one place,
<http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/index.htm>.
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governments are introducing smart cards that help citizens access health-care services without having to
provide corruption-prone cash payments for these services.9
The contribution of the present paper is to move beyond the anecdotal evidence and estimate the impact
of the spread of the Internet (i.e. the change in Internet users) on changes in corruption levels from the
1990s to 2006. Using cross-country data as well as data for U.S. states we nd that increasing Internet
penetration lowers corruption. The impact is both economically and statistically signicant.
In the regressions we control for the initial level of corruption when examining subsequent changes in the
extent of corruption. By implication, the OLS estimates of the impact of changes in Internet use on changes
in corruption will not be biased by time invariant determinants of the level of corruption, such as resource
endowments, the extent of ethnic and linguistic fractionalization, etc. This leaves out time-varying factors,
which could a¤ect both the speed of Internet di¤usion and corruption.
The fact that we are able to conrm our principal nding from the cross-country setting in the sample
of U.S. states provides some assurance that results are not tainted by omitted variable bias; after all, the
50 American states represent a very homogenous sample. In addition, by moving to the U.S. sample we are
able to test the impact of the Internet on corruption using better data. For example, when we focus on U.S.
states, we do not have to rely on indirect data based on corruption perceptions. Instead, we employ direct
data on the number of federal convictions as a measure of the intensity of corruption.
In addition, we develop an instrumental variables approach to the issue at hand. Our identication
strategy is to nd exogenous variation in the costs of using IT equipment in general, and the Internet in
particular. As explained in detail below, computer equipment is highly sensitive to power disruptions: power
surges can lead to equipment failure and damage. A higher frequency of power disruptions thereby leads to
increasing costs of IT equipment, either by elevating capital depreciation or as a result of additional costs
needed to be borne in order to protect equipment from power disruptions. A natural phenomenon which
produces power surges is lightning activity. In the U.S. about one third of all power disruptions are related
to lightning activity: in 1997 more than 100,000 computers were destroyed in the U.S. alone as a consequence
of lightning activity. We therefore hypothesize that higher lightning intensity increases the costs of using IT
equipment and thus lowers the speed of Internet di¤usion, ceteris paribus.
Using global satellite data assembled by the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),
we construct country and state level measures of lightning density. We then document, using cross-country
data, that greater lightning density is associated with more frequent power distruptions per year, which in
turn is associated with a slower speed of Internet di¤usion. These ndings support a causal link between
lightning density and the speed of Internet penetration, making the former a viable candidate instrument for
the latter. Indeed, lightning density turns out to be a strong instrument for the speed of Internet di¤usion
9Other examples of e-government include Cristal in Argentina, a Web site aiming at disseminating online information
concerning the use of public funds; the Central Vigilance Commission Web site in India, where the public among other things
can report information about wrongdoings of public servants; an on-line Customs Bureau system in the Philippines, which
has lessened the cost of trade for businesses, reduced opportunities for fraud and boosted revenue collection of the Customs
Bureau; and several computerized interstate check posts in Gujarat, India, which has signicantly reduced corruption at check
posts. See <http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/egov/anticorruption&t.htm> for more information on these and other
initiatives.
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from 1996 to 2006 in the world at large, and in the U.S. over the period 1991-2006.10 Our IV estimates
conrm the OLS results: rising Internet use over the 1990s reduced corruption.
The present paper is related to the literature which studies the determinants of the level of corruption.
Notable contributions include Ades and di Tella (1999), Treisman (2000), Brunetti and Weder (2003), Persson
et al. (2003), Glaeser and Saks (2006), and Licht et al. (2007). Conceptually, Brunetti and Weder (2003) is
perhaps the closest precursor to the present paper. The authors nd a corruption-reducing impact of a free
press, and argue that this shows that an independent press works to increase transparency. In the present
case, we expect the Internet to a¤ect corruption for essentially the same reason. Evidence to the importance
of mass media, in the context of combating corruption, is provided in the interesting study by McMillan
and Zoido (2004). In the 1990s, Peru was de facto run by Vladimiro Montesinos Torres, chief of the secret
police. In the course of exercising power, Montesinos bribed judges, politicians, and the news media. He
kept records of these transactions in the shape of signed contracts, receipts, and videotapes. Invoking a
revealed-preference type argument, McMillan and Zoido take the size of bribes as indicating just how much
importance Montesinos attached to those who were in a position to check his power. Interestingly, the
records of the various bribes paid during the years 1998 to 2000 reveal that television was paid US$ 3 million
per month in bribes, approximately 10 times as much as payments to politicians and judges, respectively.11
Arguably, this case study also hints at a potentially important di¤erence between the traditional news media
and the Internet: the latter is much harder to control by rulers. In fact, a famous metaphor compares trying
to regulate the Internet to trying to nail Jell-O to the wall.12 This is not to deny that governments cannot
make life di¢ cult for Internet users. For instance, regulations in China require the owner of a blog to
register with the government.13 Nevertheless, regulation of this kind is far from perfect since users can take
countermeasures.14
The political economy literature, which studies the impact of information on governance more generally,
is also related. This literature broadly argues that a better informed public serves to discipline the political
establishment, thus a¤ecting governance. Besley and Burgess (2002), for example, provide a theoretical model
which predicts that the e¤ort level of an incumbent politician is increasing in media access and voter turnout.
Using Indian data covering the 1958-2002 period, Besley and Burgess show that higher levels of newspaper
circulation is associated with a higher degree of responsiveness by the state government, measured by
how the individual states responded to food shortages via the public distribution of food.15 Similarly,
10Our preferred corruption measure for the cross-country sample only goes back to 1996, explaining the shorter cross-country
time span. We do, however, demonstrate that results reported in the paper also hold using an alternative corruption measure,
which dates back to 1991.
11McMillan and Zoido stress that owners of television simply have more bargaining power than judges and politicians: Only
a majority of judges or politicians need to be bribed to control the Supreme Court or to form a winning coalition, while all
television channels have to be bribed in order to contain a story.
12The party, the people and the power of cyber-talk, The Economist (April 27, 2006).
13 In addition, and at the request of Chinese o¢ cials, Microsoft removed a popular Web site in December 2005 from its Chinese
version of MSN spaces, a site used inter alia for blogs; and in 2005, Google launched a self-censored version of its search engine
in China. See The party, the people and the power of cyber-talk, The Economist (April 27, 2006).
14For instance, the non-governmental organisation Reporters Without Borders has written a Handbook for Bloggers and
Cyber-Dissidents (found at <http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/ Bloggers_Handbook2.pdf>). The book o¤ers advice on how to
blog anonymously and technical details on how to get around censorship. Also, an increasing number of re-routing Web sites
such as <http://www.anonymouse.org> o¤er full anonymity when surng the Internet.
15See also Eisensee and Strömberg (2007) on the impact of media on the extent of disaster relief in the U.S., and Strömberg
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Reinikka and Svensson (2004) show that increasing information about spending policies, announced via local
newspapers, reduced scal leakage in Uganda. Finally, Ferraz and Finan (2008) study the e¤ects of releasing
information about corruption practices on re-election chances. The analysis relies on an anti-corruption
program in Brazil initiated in 2003, when the federal government began to audit municipal governments
for their use of federal funds. Municipalities were randomly audited before and after the 2004 municipal
elections, and the outcomes of the audits were posted on the Internet and released to the media. Ferraz and
Finan estimate the e¤ects of the audits on re-election probabilities. They nd that the probability of getting
re-elected was reduced substantially in municipalities where higher levels of corruption were revealed.
Finally, the paper is related to the literature which studies the determinants of the spread of the personal
computer and the Internet across countries. Notable contributions include Caselli and Coleman (2001) on
the spread of computers, and Hargittai (1999), Beilock and Dimitrova (2003), Oyelaran-Oyeyinka and Lal
(2005), and Chinn and Fairlie (2007) on Internet penetration. This literature has documented a positive
impact of GDP per capita and the electricity infrastructure on Internet penetration, and of human capital
levels on the adoption of computers. Consequently, the level of Internet penetration should be viewed as
endogenous.16
In the present paper, however, we examine the impact of changes in the level of Internet penetration
on corruption. This choice of focus is inevitable since the Internet cannot possibly have a¤ected corruption
prior to its inception and subsequent spread. The speed at which the Internet has developed world-wide
is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the evolution of the number of Web sites from 1990 onwards. In
1996, which is the starting year for our main cross-country regressions, more than 600,000 Web sites were
in existence; by 2006 the number had exploded to more than 100 million. Our analysis for the U.S., by
contrast, starts immediately following the launch of the World Wide Web, i.e. in 1991. In this manner we
are examining the impact of within country/state Internet di¤usion on changes in corruption.
- Figure 1 about here -
While our 2SLS estimates of the impact of the Internet on corruption are considerably larger than the
OLS estimates, we cannot reject that they coincide. That is, we cannot reject that the rate of change in
Internet penetration is exogenous in our specication. This suggests that the di¤usion process has been
autonomous to changes in corruption levels over the period, conditional on the initial level of corruption,
and therefore conditional on factors which determine the level of corruption.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present our specications of choice. Section 3
outlines the identication strategy in detail; in particular, we explain how lightning activity impacts on
digital equipment. Section 4 contains a description of our data, whereas Section 5 presents our results, and
(2004) on the impact of the di¤usion of the radio across U.S. states for spending patterns.
16There is strong theoretical basis for believing that the initial adoption of new technologies is endogenous to governance.
New technologies may create political as well as economic losers, for which reason incumbent entrepreneurs and politicians
may try to block adoption (Mokyr, 1990; Parente and Prescott, 1999; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001). It seems plausible that
places with widespread corruption, for example, may have adopted the Internet later, due to the inuence of politicians, civil
servants, or both. A positive impact from governance indicators, or income per capita, on the level of Internet users can be
rationalized by this mechanism.
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discusses their economic signicance and robustness. Section 6 o¤ers concluding remarks.
2 Specication
Since governance indicators tend to be persistent over time, empirical work on the determinants of corruption
usually seeks to explain di¤erences in corruption levels across countries. That is, they focus on between-
country variation in corruption. In the present case, however, the inevitable choice of focus is on changes
in corruption. The Internet is a recent phenomenon, and, as such, cannot possibly have a¤ected corruption
levels prior to its inception, adoption and widespread use. As a result, we study whether changes in Internet
penetration can explain changes in corruption over the time-period during which the Internet has been in
operation.
For the most part we will rely on the following parsimonious specication:
DCCIi = 0 + 1DINTERNETi + 2CCIinitial;i + "i; (1)
where DCCIi is the change in corruption levels between an initial and a nal year, CCIfinal;i CCIinitial;i,
whereas DINTERNETi is the change in Internet penetration during this period, INTERNETfinal;i  
INTERNETinitial;i.
Specication (1) has the virtue of automatically controlling for (a potentially large set of) variables which
may a¤ect the level of corruption. To see this more clearly, observe that (1) is equivalent to the following
levels regression with a lagged dependent variable:
CCIfinal;i = 0 + 1DINTERNETi + (2 + 1)CCIinitial;i + "i: (2)
Accordingly, any time invariant (or slow moving) structural characteristics a¤ecting the level of corruption
will be picked up by CCIinitial;i (e.g., natural resource endowments or ethnic fractionalization). This reduces
the scope for omitted variable bias.
Of course, while specication (1) reduces the likelihood that Cov(DINTERNETi; "i) 6= 0, it does not
rule it out entirely. Time-varying characteristics may be omitted, causing Cov(DINTERNETi; "i) = 0
to fail nonetheless. Since previous research has documented an impact of GDP per capita on the level of
corruption and Internet usage, it is an obvious candidate. Consequently, we also run regressions of the form
DCCIi = 0 + 1DINTERNETi + 2CCIinitial;i + 3GY CAPi + "i; (3)
where GY CAPi represents real GDP per capita growth. Observe that the level of GDP per capita in the
initial year is implicitly controlled for by the inclusion of CCIinitial;i. Hence, only the change in GDP per
capita, from this initial year to the nal year, should be included in an e¤ort to explain CCIfinal;i, and
therefore DCCIi:
We will be running various robustness checks by varying the underlying sample. For example, we estimate
the above statistical models in a world-wide sample, on restricted samples excluding individual regions one
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after another, and by running the regressions using data for the 50 U.S. states. The latter exercise is
particularly revealing since we expect the U.S. sample to be fairly homogenous in many respects, thus
limiting further the risk of omitted variable bias.
Nevertheless, in spite of these checks one may worry that the magnitude of the obtained estimate for 1
could be misleading on account of Cov(DINTERNETi; "i) 6= 0. To address this concern we employ an IV
approach. The next section describes our identication strategy in detail.
3 Identication
In order to explain changes in Internet use, from the time of the Webs inception to present-day, one needs
to explain IT investments. In this regard the user cost of IT capital plays a central role. A higher level
of user cost implies a lower desired (long-run) IT capital stock, which ceteris paribus will imply lower IT
investments during adjustment. By implication, the speed of Internet pentration will occur at a slower pace.
The identication strategy employed in the present paper is therefore to nd exogenous determinants of
the user costs associated with digital equipment in general, and therefore the Internet in particular. As is
well known, the user cost of capital depends, among other things, on the rate of capital depreciation (Hall
and Jorgenson, 1967). Capital depreciation is one important avenue through which our instrument a¤ects
the di¤usion process.
Digital equipment, such as the computer, is highly sensitive to power disruptions. Such disruptions
are likely to cause down-time, though sudden power surges may also damage the equipment and randomly
destroy or alter data. In other words, power disruptions tend to increase the user cost of IT capital. A natural
phenomenon which damages digital equipment, by producing power failures, is lightning activity (e.g., Shim
et al., 2000 Ch. 2; Chisholm, 2000).
Perhaps surprisingly, the inuence from lightning activity is far from trivial. The National Lightning
Safety Institute, a nonprot organization, reports that lightning in the United States alone accounted for
more than 100,000 laptop and desktop computer losses in 1997.17 NASA (2007) points out that the main
impetus to lightning research in the late 1960s was the danger of lightning to aerospace vehicles and solid-
state electronics used in computers and other electronic devices.18 In order to understand why lightning is
so problematic some remarks on the physics of power supply and distribution are required.
Power plants create commercial electric power with alternating voltage. Alternating voltage, V (t), as a
function of time, t, takes the form of a sinusoidal wave, i.e. V (t) = V0  sin(2  f  t), where f is the number
of oscillations per second (f is usually expressed in hertz (Hz), where f Hz means f cycles per second). The
time required for the pattern to be repeated is the period T = 1=f . Whenever this sinusoidal wave changes
size, shape, frequency, develops notches, etc., technically, there is a power disturbance.
17<http://www.lightningsafety.com/nlsi_lls/nlsi_annual_usa_losses.htm>
18Solid-state electronics refers to an electronic device in which electricity ows through solid semiconductor crystals rather
than through vacuum tubes. Transistors, made of one or more semiconductors, are at the heart of modern solid-state devices.
In the case of integrated circuits, millions of transistors can be involved. Microprocessors are the most complicated integrated
circuits. They are composed of millions of transistors that have been congured as thousands of individual digital circuits, each
of which performs some specic logic function (see Kressel 2007 for an enjoyable discussion with a historical perspective).
8
It is important to appreciate that computers to this day remain extremely sensitive to such disturbances.
For more than a century the reliability of the electricity grid has rested at 99:9%, or so-called three nines
reliability. Three-nines reliability permits roughly 9 hours of outages per year. This was su¢ cient when the
economy was built around light bulbs and electric motors. But microprocessor-based controls and computer
networks demand at least 99:9999% reliability (or six nines reliability).19 This amounts to only seconds
of allowable outages per year.
The reason why such high reliability is required is that equipment based on solid-state electronics, such as
computer chips, is constructed to work under conditions of a cleansinusoidal wave form. The power supply
of a digital device converts the alternating current to direct current with a much reduced voltage. Digital
processing of information works by having transistors turnthis small voltage on and o¤at several gigahertz
(Kressel, 2007). If the wave becomes disturbed or distorted, the conversion process can become corrupted.
This may result in equipment failure (Conroy, 1999). In fact, sensitivity to small distortions increases with
the miniaturization of transistors, which is the key to increasing speed in microprocessors (Kressel, 2007).
Voltage disturbances measuring less than one cycle are su¢ cient to crash servers, computers, and other
microprocessor-based devices (Yeager and Stalhkopf, 2000; Electricity Power Research Institute, 2003). To
put it di¤erently, at a 60 Hz frequency (the standard in the U.S.) this means that a power disturbance of a
duration less than 1=60th of a second is enough to crash a computer!
By some estimates, lightning is the direct cause of one third of all power quality disturbances in the United
States (Chisholm and Cummins, 2006). Moreover, the probability of lightning-caused power interruptions or
equipment damage scales linearly with lightning density (Chisholm, 2000; Chisholm and Cummins, 2006).20
As a result, lightning-caused computer failure is a quite pervasive phenomenon.
Some of the most noted instances of lightning triggered computer failures relate to airports. For example,
according to Germanys Federal O¢ ce for Information Security (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informa-
tionstechnik, BSI), a major German airport experienced a lightning strike very close to the air tra¢ c control
tower. Despite the external lightning protection system that had been installed (a lightning conductor), the
computerized re extinguishing system in the IT area was triggered by the incidence, and, as a result, all
airport operations were paralyzed for two hours (BSI, 2004). The New York Times (July 3, 1999) reports how
air tra¢ c across the northeastern United States was disrupted after lightning hit New Englands main air
tra¢ c control center in Nashua, N.H.21 After the lightning strike, the mainframe computer began reporting
error messages to technicians, apparently because devices attached to it were not running properly.
In general, lightning discharges can enter electronic equipment inside a residence in four principal ways
(IEEE, 2005). First, lightning can strike the network of power, phone, and cable television wiring. This
network, particularly when elevated, acts as an e¤ective collector of lightning surges. The wiring conducts
the surges directly into the residence, and then to the connected equipment. In fact, the initial lightning
impulse is so strong that equipment connected to cables up to 2 km away from the site of the strike can be
19See for example National Energy Technology Laboratory (2003). Yeager and Stalhkopf (2000) actually argue that nine
nines reliability is needed. See also The power industrys quest for the high nines, The Economist (March 22, 2001).
20This linear scaling can be expressed precisely. Let NS denote the number of strikes to a conducter per 100 km of power
line length, h the average height (in meters) of the conducter above ground level, and GFD the ground ash density, then
NS = 3:8 GFD  h0:45 (see Chisholm, 2000).
21Lightning Hits Control Center And Grounds Many Planesby Matthew L. Wald.
9
damaged.22 Second, when lightning strikes directly to or nearby air conditioners, satellite dishes, exterior
lights, etc., the wiring of these devices can carry surges into the residence. Third, lightning may strike nearby
objects such as trees, agpoles, road signs, etc., which are not directly connected to the residence. When this
happens, the lightning strike radiates a strong electromagnetic eld, which can be picked up by the wiring in
the building, producing large voltages that can damage equipment. Finally, lightning can strike directly into
the structure of the building. This latter type of strike is extremely rare, even in areas with a high lightning
density.
Accordingly, if computer equipment is left unprotected, high lightning intensity will work so as to increase
the user cost of digital capital by elevating the rate of capital depreciation. Of course, steps may be taken to
protect the equipment. A high-quality surge protector provides protection against voltage spikes, for example.
High-tech companies install generators to supplement their power needs, thereby insuring themselves against
power failure. They also add uninterruptedly power sources relying on batteries to power computers
until generators kick in. These initiatives, however, will in any case increase the costs of acquiring digital
equipment, and thereby the user cost of IT capital. The crux of the matter is that if one lives in an
environment with a high annual lightning density, this adds to the costs of using modern electronics, including
a computer.23
In the discussion above we have focused on the impact of power quality on the marginal costs of IT
capital. But this is not the only way in which lightning may matter for Internet di¤usion. In areas with
frequent and prolonged power disruptions and outages, the marginal benet of owning a computer is surely
diminished. This mechanism will also work to lower the speed of Internet di¤usion. Consequently, lightning
matters to Internet di¤usion for two reasons. By inducing power disturbances, it increases the marginal
costs as well as lowers the marginal benets of IT capital. This is not to say that these two complementary
channels nessesarily are equally relevant everywhere. In the U.S. sample we would conjecture that the benet
channel is of secondary relevance; power outages and disruptions are likely of too short a duration to seriously
impact on the perceived benets from IT. In the cross-country sample, however, both the cost channel and
the benet channel may be relevant; especially in poor countries. For this reason we would expect a stronger
impact of lightning on Internet penetration in the cross-country context, compared to the U.S. sample.24
Against this background we propose lightning density as an instrument for the speed at which Internet
22According to BSI (2004, p. 258), with discharges of several hundred thousand volts, lightning strikes can achieve currents
of up to 200,000 amperes. This enormous electrical energy is released and dies away within a period of 50-100 microseconds.
A lightning strike of this order of magnitude originating from a distance of about 2 km will still cause voltage peaks that are
capable of destroying sensitive electronic devices in the power lines of a building.
23Besides, the above mentioned protective devises are not necessarily enough to ensure against damage. According to the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), a typical surge protector will not protect equipment from a nearby
lightning strike (see <http://www.lightningsafety.noaa.gov/ indoors.htm>). Generators, in turn, do not react fast enough and
can deliver dirty power; batteries are expensive to maintain and may also not react fast enough. See e.g., The power industrys
quest for the high nines, The Economist (March 22, 2001).
24Some may instinctively believe that the marginal cost of protecting the computer (completely) from lightning also is
negligible in the U.S. context. In this regard William A. Chisholm has suggested to us in personal correspondence that a laptop
computer with battery and wireless Internet access may indeed be completely protected from lightning at a cost of about $200
extra. This is hardly a trivial expense. However, and more importantly, these measures will not protect the nearby cell-phone
tower providing wireless infrastructure. The point being that the cost of wireless service will reect the local providerscosts
in replacing equipment when the tall tower is struck repeatedly by lightning. Hence, either way, lightning density will elevate
the costs of being online.
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use per capita changed over the period in question. In Section 5.3 we employ cross-country data so as
to corroborate the logic of the identication strategy. That is, we document that higher lightning density
indeed is associated with more power outages per year. Moreover, a higher frequency of power disruptions
has a marked impact on the speed of Internet di¤usion, conrming previous ndings of a link between the
electricity infrastructure and the spread of the Internet. In reduced form, this motivates empirically the use
of lightning density as an instrument for changes in Internet use over the 1990s.
Lightning is certainly exogenous in a deep sense. However, this does not ensure validity of the exclusion
restriction. Validity rests on a redundancy condition in (1). Climate-related circumstances are likely to
map into levels of corruption. For instance, to the extent that countries with a high lightning density have
a higher endowment of natural resources, this is likely to a¤ect levels of corruption (resource curse). As
mentioned in Section 2, this circumstance is controlled for with the inclusion of CCIinitial: Validity of the
exclusion restriction therefore requires that lightning has no direct impact on changes in corruption over the
period under study once we control for the level of corruption initially, CCIinitial. Formally, let z denote
the lightning density; validity requires Cov("; z) = 0, where " is the error term in (1).
4 Data description
4.1 Corruption
4.1.1 Cross country
Global corruption is measured using the well-known Control of Corruption Index (CCI) compiled by Kauf-
mann et al. (2007). The CCI measure, which ranges from  2:5 (worst) to 2:5 (best), is available biannually
from 1996 to 2002 and annually from 2002 onwards.25 The CCI indicator attempts to measure the extent
to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption as
well as capture by elites and private interests (Kaufmann et al., 2007, p. 4). The indicator is based on
a large number of individual data sources, which are then aggregated into one measure by an unobserved
components model. This means that the aggregate measure is a weighted average of the underlying individ-
ual data sources, with weights reecting the precision of each of these underlying data sources. By virtue of
being a solution to a statistical signal extraction problem, the aggregate CCI indicator is presumably more
informative than any individual data source.26 This makes the CCI the most comprehensive measure of
corruption around.27
25These boundaries correspond to the 0.005 and 0.995 percentiles of the standard normal distribution. For a few countries,
country ratings can exceed these boundaries when scores from individual data sources are particularly high or low (Kaufmann
et al., 2007).
26Svensson (2005), however, notes that the aggregation procedures used by Kaufmann et al. presumes that subindicator
measurement errors are independent across sources. In reality, errors may be correlated since producers of di¤erent indices
read the same reports and most likely each others evaluations. If the assumption of independence is relaxed, the gain from
aggregating a number of di¤erent reports is less clear.
27The widely reported Corruption Perception Index (CPI) compiled by Transparency International forms part of the CCI
measure (see Kaufmann et al., 2007, Table A13). Reasuringly, the simple correlation between CCI and CPI is 0:97. A high
correlation is not unexpected since corruption reects the underlying institutional framework (Svensson, 2005).
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DCCI is calculated as the di¤erence between CCI in 2006 and 1996, i.e.
DCCIi = CCI2006;i   CCI1996;i: (4)
Ideally, we would like to go back to 1991, the launch date of the WWW (cf. Figure 1). Unfortunately,
with the preferred CCI measure this is not possible. However, in Section 5.6 we will go back to 1991 in the
cross-country context using a di¤erent measure of corruption.
As noted by Kaufmann et al. (2007), despite being somewhat persistent, governance indicators do change
over relatively short periods such as a decade. This is illustrated in Figure 2, which plots the 1996 CCI score
on the horizontal axis, the 2006 CCI score on the vertical axis, and a 45-degree line. Countries above the
45-degree line correspond to improvements in corruption, while countries below the line saw deteriorations
in corruption.
- Figure 2 about here -
4.1.2 U.S. states
Turning to U.S. corruption data, we do not have to rely on a perception-based indicator of corruption.28
Instead we use a more direct measure of corruption, viz. the number of government o¢ cials convicted for
corrupt practices through the Federal Justice Department. We name this variable CC:
The corruption data is reported in the Justice Departments Report to Congress on the Activities and
Operations of the Public Integrity Section. This publication provides the number of federal, state, and
local public o¢ cials convicted of a corruption-related crime by state. As argued by Glaeser and Saks (2006),
conviction levels capture the extent to which federal prosecutors have charged and convicted public o¢ cials
for misconduct in each of the 50 U.S. states. There are potential problems with using conviction rates to
measure corruption: in corrupt places, the judicial system is itself likely to be corrupt, meaning that fewer
people will be charged with corrupt practices. This problem, however, is diminished when focusing on federal
convictions, the reason being that the federal judicial system is somewhat isolated from local corruption.
Consequently, it should treat people similarly across states (Glaeser and Saks, 2006).
DCC is calculated as the di¤erence between CC in 2006 and 1991, i.e.
DCCi = log(1 + CC2006;i)  log(1 + CC1991;i): (5)
Note that for the U.S. sample we can go back to 1991. This is probably more important for the U.S. sample as
compared to the cross-country sample since the U.S. was the frontrunner in terms of early Internet di¤usion.
28Some are sceptical concerning the use of perception-based corruption data (Svensson, 2005). Interestingly, however, Olken
(2006) has provided novel evidence on the relation between corruption perceptions and a direct measure of corruption in the
context of villages across Indonesia. In a household survey, villagers were asked to state their beliefs about the likelihood of cor-
ruption in a road-building project in their village. Olken estimated the direct costs of corruption, called missing expenditures,
by the di¤erence between the actual and reported costs involved with the project. The actual costs were estimated by engineers
after the roads were built by digging samples of the road to determine quantities, surveying local suppliers to determine prices,
and interviewing villagers to determine wages. The empirical results show that villagersperceptions of corruption do appear to
be positively (albeit weakly) correlated with the direct missing expenditure measure. Olken nds that corruption in the project
was predominantly hidden by inating quantities, which are hard for villagers to detect, as opposed to marking up prices, which
are easier for villagers to detect.
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Note also that we did not employ a (natural) log-transformation in the global data since CCI is an index.
In contrast, the CC measure is a levels variable, so using logs means taking out scale e¤ects.29 Importantly,
note also that unlike CCI, higher values of CC corresponds to more corruption.
Figure 3 plots the (log-transformed) 1991 CC score on the horizontal axis, the (log-transformed) 2006
CC score on the vertical axis, and a 45-degree line. States below the 45-degree line now correspond to
improvements in corruptions, while states above the line saw deteriorations in corruption.
- Figure 3 about here -
4.2 Internet
4.2.1 Cross country
Our key explanatory variable is the number of Internet users per 100 people. For a growing number of
countries, the number of Internet users is based on regular surveys. In situations where surveys are not
available, an estimate can be derived based on the number of subscribers. Data is compiled by the Inter-
national Telecommunication Union (ITU), and made available in the World Development Indicators (WDI)
2007.
Since global corruption data goes back to 1996, we calculate the change in Internet users over this period:
DINTERNET = INTERNETi;2005   INTERNETi;1996;
where 2005 is the most recent year for Internet users in the WDI (2007).
4.2.2 U.S. states
Internet users per 100 people in the U.S. is based on data collected in a supplement to the October 2003
Current Population Survey (CPS), which included questions about computer and Internet use.30 The CPS
is a multi-stage probability sample with coverage in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. The sample
was selected from the 1990 Decennial Census les and is continually updated to account for new residential
construction. To obtain the sample, the United States is divided into 2,007 geographic areas, and about
60,000 occupied households are eligible for interviews.
Since U.S. corruption data goes back to 1991, the launch date of the WWW, we dene the change in
Internet use by state population as
DINTERNET = INTERNETi;2003   INTERNETi;1991 = INTERNETi;2003;
since INTERNETi;1991 = 0 for all i (i.e. for all states):
29We use the log(1 + CC) since CC is zero in 14 out of 100 state-year observations.
30Released October 27, 2005, by the U.S. Census Bureau.
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4.3 Lightning
4.3.1 Cross country
The raw data for ash densities (ashes per km2 per year) comes from NASA. The Global Hydrology
and Climate Center (GHCC) has designed, constructed, and deployed numerous types of groundbased,
airborne, and spacebased sensors to detect lightning activity and to characterize the electrical behavior of
thunderstorms as part of their research on atmospheric science. The GHCCs spacebased sensors detect all
forms of lightning activity over land and sea 24 hours a day. Thus, such sensors allowed the development
of the rst global database of lightning activity, which has been used so far for severe storm detection and
analysis, and for lightning-atmosphere interaction studies.
In this paper, we rely on the data from the Optical Transient Detector (OTD), a space based sensor
launched on April 3, 1995. For a period of roughly 5 years the satellite orbited Earth once every 100
minutes at an altitude of 740 km. At any given instant, it viewed a 1300 km  1300 km region of Earth.
Flasheswere determined by comparing the luminance of adjoining frames of OTD optical data. When the
di¤erence was larger than a specied threshold value, an eventwas recorded.31 These satellite-based data
are archived and cataloged by the GHCC, where they are also made available, free of charge.32
We apply the data from a high-resolution (0.5 degree latitude  0.5 degree longitude)33 grid of total
lightning bulk production across the planet, expressed as a ash density, from the completed 5 year OTD
mission. Figure 4 provides a world map of the average ash density over the 5 years period.
- Figure 4 about here -
Average ash densities are constructed for the Minimum Bounding Rectangle (MBR) of each country.
The MBR is the rectangular area covering the northernmost, southernmost, westernmost, and easternmost
limits of an object. The MBR is a frequently used approximation for computing spatial indices on di¤erent
geographical features (Caldwell, 2005).
The coordinates for each country are taken from the GEOnet Names Server (GNS) at the U.S. National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agencys (NGA) and the U.S. Board on Geographic Names(U.S. BGN) database
of foreign geographic feature names.34 We have used the version released on October 2, 2007.35 The GNS
data covers the entire planet with the exception of the U.S. and Antarctica. The MBR for the U.S. was
constructed using data for the 50 individual U.S. states, where data is taken from the Geographic Names
Information System at the U.S. BGN.36
Using these coordinates, we construct minimum and maximum latitude and longitude values for each
country. Caldwell (2005) emphasizes two key issues that a¤ect the accuracy of the MBR as an approx-
31Basically, these optical sensors use high-speed cameras designed to look for changes in the tops of clouds. By analyzing
a narrow wavelength band (near-infrared region of the spectrum) they can spot brief lightning ashes even under daytime
conditions.
32<http://thunder.msfc.nasa.gov/data/#OTD_DATA>
33<ftp://microwave.nsstc.nasa.gov/pub/data/lightning-satellite/lis-otd-climatology/HRFC/LISOTD_HRFC_V2.2.hdf>
34<http://earth-info.nga.mil/gns/html/nameles.htm>
35<ftp://ftp.nga.mil/pub2/gns_data/geonames_dd_dms_date_20071002.zip>
36<http://geonames.usgs.gov/domestic/download_data.htm>
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imation of the area coverage of a feature. These are the presence of multiple component parts and the
shape/orientation of the particular country. As an example of the former, the Bahamas consists of 2000 cays
and 700 islands, which makes the Bahamas impossible to encapsulate with a MBR without including ocean.
Concerning the latter, a country not well approximated by an MBR due to its diagonal shape is Japan. A
third issue concerns small countries. Malta is only 316 km2, which is much smaller than the area of one high
resolution grid at this latitude, around 2:500 km2. Furthermore, Malta is located in the crossing between
two gridlines, which means that it is encapsulated by four grids. Therefore, the MBR around Malta is much
larger than the actual size of Malta.
To assess the validity of the MBR as an approximation of the country area, we calculated the ratio of
the area of the MBR to the actual area of a country. In our sample of 113 countries, this ratio has a mean
of 3.8 and a median of 2.0. The Bahamas lies in the top of this range with a ratio of 59.2 due to the features
mentioned above. Thereafter comes Malta with 31.2. In the bottom of the range lies Egypt with a ratio of
1.1. The larger ratios in this sample mostly represent instances where areas of the ocean are included when
attempting to encapsulate the country. As lightning is less frequent over sea, this will bias the average ash
rates downwards for these countries.
Consequently, we employ two additional measures of lightning activity: Average ash densities in country
capitals and in the midpoint of each countrys MBR. As it turns out, our results hold regardless of which of
the three measures we employ.
4.3.2 U.S. states
For U.S. states we compile the state MBR as described above. As also mentioned above, coordinate data for
U.S. states is from the Geographic Names Information System at the U.S. BGN.37
It should be noted that the OTD data provides observations on total lightning events, i.e. both intra-
cloud, cloud-to-cloud, cloud-to-sky and cloud-to-ground lightning. In other words, OTD data does not
separate out cloud-to-ground lightning incidences. The pertinent characteristic of lightning in the evaluation
of risk to electronic equipment and electric power systems is the cloud-to-ground ash density. Since the mid-
1980s, it has been possible to measure ground ash density more directly using networks of electromagnetic
sensors. Such Lightning Location Systems (LLS) are able to resolve individual ground strikes comprising a
ash with high spatial and temporal accuracy. However, many parts of the world, particularly the developing
world, are not covered by the LLS data.38
Fortunately, accurate cloud-to-ground data does exist for the 48 continental U.S. states; it does not exist
for Alaska and Hawaii. These cloud-to-ground lightning ashes, which are measured by the U.S. National
Lightning Detection Network (NLDN), are provided by Vaisala for the period 1996-2005.39 NLDN consists
of more than 100 remote, ground-based lightning sensors, which instantly detect the electromagnetic signals
given o¤ when lightning strikes Earths surface. Comparing the NLDN ground-based measures with the
NASA satelite-based measures for the U.S. provides an indication of the extent to which the total amount
37<http://geonames.usgs.gov/domestic/download_data.htm>
38 In addition, data is not freely available for the parts of the world actually covered.
39See <http://www.vaisala.com/thunderstorm>
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of lightning is a reliable indicator of cloud-to-ground lightning.
Figure 5 provides a scatter plot of total lightning against cloud-to-ground lightning. Note that by deni-
tion total lightning should be at least as large as cloud-to-ground lightning, which is conrmed by the gure;
all observations are below the 45 degree line.40
- Figure 5 about here -
In spite of the di¤erence in time periods, Figure 5 clearly shows that there is agreement between the
two measures of lightning. With a correlation above 0:94, total lightning is indeed a very good proxy for
cloud-to-ground lightning in the U.S. sample. This can also be expected to be the case in the cross-country
data as well, cf. Chisholm and Cummins (2006).
Nevertheless, in the regressions below we will use all available information to form three instruments: the
cloud-to-ground lightning density provided by Vaisala; the MBR-based lightning density of a state, which
we ourselves construct using OTD data; and the lightning density at the midpoint of the state MBR, which
also involves OTD data.
4.4 GDP per capita
4.4.1 Cross country
Real GDP per capita, Y CAP; for the global sample is taken from WDI (2007). Specically, we calculate the
growth rate of real GDP per capita as
GY CAPi = (Y CAPi;2005=Y CAPi;1996)  1;
where 2005 is the most recent year with observations on real GDP per capita in the WDI (2007).
4.4.2 U.S. states
For the U.S. our income measure is personal income per capita taken from the State Personal Income
Database from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). We deate nominal income per capita using the
implicit price deator for personal consumption expenditures, index year 2000, also from BEA. We calculate
the growth rate in real personal income per capita over the period 1991 to 2006 as
GY CAPi = (Y CAPi;2006=Y CAPi;1991)  1:
4.5 Electrical Outages
In order to examine whether indeed lightning is associated with more frequent power disruptions, which
in turn a¤ects the speed of Internet di¤usion within countries, we need data on the frequency of power
40NASAs ash densities of total lightning are calculated for the 1995-1999 period, while Vaisalas cloud-to-ground measures
are calculated for the 1996-2005 period. In addition, Vaisala uses mile2 as the area unit; these where converted into km2 by
dividing by the mile2 numbers by 1:6092.
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failures.41 In spite of our best e¤orts, we have only been able to obtain data on power failures for a cross
section of countries. The cross-country measure of the frequency of power disruptions is collected by the
World Bank, and it is available in WDI (2007) for the years 2002-2006. Specically, the variable measures
the average number of days per year that establishments experience power outages or surges from the public
grid. We will use this variable as a proxy for the intensity of power disturbances.
This variable, which we will refer to as OUTAGES, form part of the World Bank Groups Enterprise
Surveys.42 These surveys cover almost 58,000 rms in 97 countries for the period 20022006. For most
countries electrical outages are measured only at one point in time during the period 2002-2006. However,
for 26 countries there are two observations, one in 2002 and one in 2005. In these cases we use the 2005
values.
5 Results
5.1 Summary statistics
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the main levels variables.43 Several features are worth noting. The
cross-country sample illustrates the rapid rise of the Internet. The (unweighted) cross-country average
fraction of the population having Internet access was 1.5% in 1996; by 2005, this number had risen to
nearly 23%. During the process of Internet di¤usion, the cross-country variation also rises enormously. The
standard deviation in fact rises by a factor of 7, from 1996 to 2005, reecting what some have called the
increasing digital divide across the globe (e.g., Chinn and Fairlie, 2007). Accordingly, the spread of the
Internet has clearly progressed at very di¤erent speeds around the world.44
- Table 1 about here -
In the U.S. sample this continues to hold true. The (unweighted) cross-state average fraction of the
population having Internet access rises from zero in 1991 to roughly 60% in late 2003. However, this increase
is far from uniform. In late 2003, the number of Internet users per 100 people varies from a low of 43 to a
high of 72. In the cross-country data this corresponds to moving from number 25 (just behind France) to
the 5th place in the 2005 world distribution (just behind Norway). Hence, even in the U.S. sample there is
41This independent check of the economic relevance of our identication strategy is conducted in Section 5.3.
42<http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/>
43The 113 countries in the cross-country sample are the following: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia,
Austria, Azerbaijan, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep., Costa Rica, Cote dIvoire, Croatia, Cuba,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France,
Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong (China), Hungary, Iceland, In-
dia, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Rep., Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia,
Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Nicaragua,
Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Russian Fed-
eration, Senegal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab
Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela,
Vietnam, Zimbabwe. The U.S. states include all fty states.
44 In 2005, Iceland is the country in the cross-country sample with the highest Internet penetation at nearly 87%; Niger ranks
last at 0.2%.
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evidence suggestive of substantial variation in the speed of Internet di¤usion.
In the context of the cross-country data, it is also worth observing that the intensity of power failure
varies tremendously across the globe. In the median country power outages or surges occur on average 9.6
days per year. Notice, however, that the standard deviation is huge: 46.6 days. Indeed the range varies
from a low of 0.04 days (Korea) to a high of 248.96 days (Bangladesh). Our sample only contains 8 OECD
countries (Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Greece, Korea, Ireland, Spain and Portugal). Within this group
the intensity of power failures is rather small, as expected. In this group the largest observation is 3.7 days
(Switzerland).
5.2 Ordinary Least Squares
5.2.1 Cross country
Table 2 explores the partial association between changes in Internet use and changes in corruption for the
cross-country data. The dependent variable is DCCI, dened by equation (4). Column 2 estimates the
parsimonious specication (1), described in Section 2. The column shows that DINTERNET is estimated
with high precision: With a t-value above 4, signicance is well below the 1% level. Including the growth
rate of real GDP per capita, i.e. estimating (3), has no impact on the slope estimate associated with
DINTERNET , cf. column 3. Moreover, the growth rate of real GDP per capita holds no explanatory
power once we control for initial corruption and changes in Internet use.
- Table 2 about here -
The standardized coe¢ cient associated with column 2 is slightly above 0:67.45 This means that a
one-standard deviation increase in DINTERNET is associated with 0:67 standard deviations increase in
DCCI.46 In fact, the simple specication in column 2 can explain 22% of the variation in changes in levels
of corruption of the period 1996 to 2006.47
The point estimate associated with changes in Internet use is remarkably robust. In a statistical sense,
it remains constant when we exclude regions of the world one-by-one (using the WDI classication), as
done in Table 3. The last row in Table 3 performs an F-test, where the null is that the slope estimate
of DINTERNET associated with each subsample is equal to the slope estimate associated with the full
sample, i.e. column 2 in Table 2. The null cannot be rejected at any conventional level of signicance. In
addition, including GY CAP does not change this conclusion, for which reason it has been excluded from
the regressions reported in Table 3. Consequently, the partial association between changes in Internet use
and changes in corruption over the period under consideration is very robust.
- Table 3 about here -
45The standardized (or beta) coe¢ cient associated with 1 in (1) is given by (DINTERNET /DCCI)1; where j is the
standard deviation of variable j:
46We will address the economic signicance in more detail in Section 5.5.
47Note that in the equivalent levels equation given by (2), more than 86% of the variation in corruption levels can be accounted
for.
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5.2.2 U.S. states
Turning to the 50 U.S. states, Table 4 reports results from OLS. The dependent variable is DCC, dened by
equation (5). Column 2 estimates the specication (1). DINTERNET is also estimated with high precision
in the U.S. sample.48 With a t-value of 2.43 in column 2, signicance holds at the 2% level. The specication
(1) accounts for more than 30% of the variation in DCC in the U.S. sample. Moreover, including the growth
rate of real GDP per capita once again has no impact on the slope estimate associated with DINTERNET ,
and, as was also the case in the the cross-country sample, the growth rate of real GDP per capita holds no
explanatory power in the U.S. sample once we control for initial corruption and the change in Internet users,
cf. column 3. The standardized coe¢ cient associated with column 2 is roughly  0:33.
- Table 4 about here -
5.3 Towards Two-Stage Least Squares: The Zeroth Stage
As explained in Section 3, we aim to obtain identication by using lightning density as an instrument for
changes in Internet users over the period where the WWW has been in operation. The rationale for this
strategy, outlined in Section 3, can be expressed in the following schematic fashion:
LIGHTNING DENSITY  ! ELECTRICAL OUTAGES  ! INTERNET USE.
where the second arrow implicitly subsumes the impact of power surges on the costs and benets of IT
capital. While we argue these links are highly plausible on physical grounds, it does not follow that they are
quantitatively relevant in an economic context. In fact, absent evidence of these links, one may worry that
an observed association between changes in Internet penetration and lightning could be spurious. By exten-
sion, the plausibility of the indentifying assumption that the lightning variable does not a¤ect corruption,
conditional on Internet penetration and initial corruption levels (cf. Section 2), would be hard to gauge.
Clearly, the plausibility of the exclusion restriction is related to the empirical relevance of the full theory,
which underlies the identication strategy. To address this issue, we explore the above chain of causation in
the present section before turning to 2SLS regressions in the next section.
To proceed, we express the underlying logic of the identication strategy as a system of equations:
DINTERNETi = 0 + 1  log (OUTAGESi) +X0II + "i; (6)
log (OUTAGESi) = 0 + 1  log(LIGHTNINGi) +X0OO + i: (7)
where XO and XI contain additional controls. The basic question is whether 1 > 0 and 1 < 0.
Comparable data on electrical outages is only available for the cross-country sample; the data used
48Note that increased digital information will both increase the risk of detection for a corrupt o¢ cial (the detection technology
is improved) as well as lower the incentive to commit corrupt acts. Better detection technology will work in the direction of
more convictions, whereas lower incentives will work in the direction of fewer convictions. A priori, the net e¤ect of more
information on convictions is thus ambiguous. Our results show that empirically the net e¤ect is negative, implying that the
incentive e¤ect dominates.
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when estimating equations (6) and (7) are therefore those described in Sections 4.1.1, 4.2.1, 4.3.1, and 4.5.
Specically, in the regressions to follow we employ the MBR-based average lightning density for a country
(i.e., what we refer to as INSTRUMENT 1in the next section). Using either of the alternatives described
in Section 4.3.1 produces very similar results. In the interest of brevity, however, we only report the results
from employing this variable in equation (7). Moreover, we will run regressions (6) and (7) both without
controls and with controls, in which case XO and XI equal CCI in 1996.
In principle, a variety of variables could be included in XO and XI . The choice of only including initial
corruption as additional control is made for two reasons. First, governance indicators have previously been
shown to a¤ect energy e¢ ciency (Frederikson et al., 2004) as well as Internet use (e.g., Chinn and Fairlie,
2006). Second, and more important in the present context, by controlling for corruption these specications
will have direct bearing on the validity of the 2SLS regressions in the next section: the identication strategy
(implicitly) requires lightning to a¤ect outages, and outages to a¤ect Internet use conditional on CCI1996.
Consequently, this is the setting where condence in the validity of the identication strategy, involving
lightning as an instrument for changes in Internet use, is required.
Table 5 reports the results from estimating equations (7) (columns 1 and 2) and (6) (columns 3-5). In
column 1 we report the bivariate association between lightning density and electrical outages and surges.
The correlation is both highly signicant and positive as required. Moreover, lightning can account for 13%
of the global variation in electrical outages. In column 2 we add CCI1996. The size of the point estimate for
lightning declines but remains signicant at the 5% level. Higher levels of corruption are associated with less
power reliability. This is consistent with the ndings of Frederikson et al. (2004). Figure 6 provides a visual
impression of the partial correlation between log(LIGHTNING) and log(OUTAGES) (i.e., conditional on
CCI1996). Taking the point estimate at face value, the results imply that an increase in lightning density of
one percent increases the number of days where power outages take place by about 0.4%.
- Table 5 about here -
- Figure 6 about here -
Turning to column 3 of Table 5, we nd that a higher intensity of electric power failures hampers the
spread of the Internet within countries. Indeed, electrical outages and surges can account for nearly 60% of
the total variation in the Internet variable. Adding CCI1996 (column 4) does not change the impression of a
rst-order impact from outages to the spread of the Internet. In fact, outages appear to have a quantitatively
stronger e¤ect on the spread of the Internet than corruption. Specically, increasing log(OUTAGES) by
one standard-deviation is associated with a reduction in DINTERNET of  0:61 standard-deviation units;
in constrast, a similar exercise using CCI1996 would increase DINTERNET by 0:29 standard-deviation
units.49 Figure 7 provides a visual impression of the strength of the relation between power failures and
49We also experimented with adding log of real (ppp) income per capita in 1996 in columns (2) and (4) instead of CCI1996:
The results are similar to those reported above. This is perhaps not too surpricing in light of the fact that the correlation between
log of real (ppp) income per capita and CCI1996 is almost 0.8. We also found that the standardized coe¢ cient associated with
outages in column (4) remains numerically larger than the standardized coe¢ cient associated with log of real (ppp) income per
capita, when the latter is used instead of CCI1996.
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changes in Internet use.
- Figure 7 about here -
Finally, in column 5 we add log(LIGHTNING) as an explanatory variable. If lightning density a¤ects the
spread of the Internet in ways unrelated to electrical outages, we would expect it to be signicant conditional
on log(OUTAGES): If so, one may worry that lightning density is proxying for other variables a¤ecting
Internet di¤usion, which would raise doubts concerning the validity of the exclusion restriction maintained
in the next section. Fortunately, this is not the case: lightning is not a signicant determinant of changes
in Internet use over the period in question, conditional on power failures. This nding strongly suggests
that the statistical correlation between log(LIGHTNING) and DINTERNET , which we document in the
next section, arises due to lightnings inuence on the frequency of power failures, which in turn a¤ects the
spread of the Internet within countries.
Overall, these ndings show that the individual theoretical links underlying our identication strategy
are present in the data; they are statistically as well as economically relevant. Against this backdrop, we
now turn to 2SLS regressions, where lightning will be used as instrument for changes in Internet use.
5.4 Two-Stage Least Squares
5.4.1 Cross country
Turning now to instrumental variables methods, Table 6 reports 2SLS-based results for the cross-country
sample. Panel A of Table 6 provides results from the rst-stage regressions in the 2SLS procedure. IN-
STRUMENT 1 is the MBR-based average lightning density for a country, INSTRUMENT 2 is the lightning
density in the capital of a country, and INSTRUMENT 3 is the lightning density at the midpoint of the
country MBR. In accordance with the logic of the identication strategy, the lightning density is strongly
and negatively related to the di¤usion of the Internet. We also note that the three instruments are about
equally powerful, and yield similar results in the second stage.
- Table 6 about here -
The association between average lightning density and the change in Internet use, once the inuence
of initial corruption is partialled out, is close to the rule-of-thumbvalue suggested by Staiger and Stock
(1997). Specically, if the F -value, associated with the null of zero explanatory power of the instrument,
is above ten we need not concern ourselves with issues of weak identication: Inference based on 2SLS
estimates will not be plagued with size distortions. This rule-of-thumb, however, requires that the error
variance is homoskedastic (see assumption M, part (c) in Staiger and Stock, 1997). While this assumption is
fullled in the second-stage regression (cf. Pagan-Hall test), it fails in the rst-stage regression (cf. Breusch-
Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test). Consequently, while inspection of Panel A reveals the F -value is closeto ten
in all columns, with non-constant error variance it is not entirely clear what this means for the actual size
of signicance tests. As a consequence, using condence intervals that are robust to both heteroskedasticity
and weak identication, the nal paragraphs of this section will show that we need not worry about weak
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identication.
Turning to Panel B, we see that 2SLS yield results that are broadly consistent with OLS, cf. Table 2.
DINTERNET remains signicant at 5%; the slope estimates are roughly twice the size of the corresponding
OLS estimates but standard errors also more than double. A formal test of the equality of OLS and 2SLS
is the Hausman specication test. This test, which is reported in Table 5, Panel B, does not allow rejection
of the null that DINTERNET is exogenous. Put di¤erently, we do not detect any systematic di¤erence
between OLS and 2SLS coe¢ cient estimates. However, if our 2SLS esimates are weakly identied the overall
properties of the test are somewhat unclear.
We address the problem of potential size distortions by invoking a method proposed by Chernozhukov
and Hansen (2005), which allows us to construct condence intervals with the correct size regardless of the
strength of instruments.50 Moreover, Chernozhukov and Hansen show how these size-adjusted condence
intervals can be made robust to non i.i.d. errors. Finally, the procedure has good power properties.
Panel B reports these size-adjusted condence intervals, which are also heteroskedasicity robust. As is
evident from the table, size-adjusted condence intervals deem DINTERNET above zero in all columns.
Hence, qualitatively, weak-instrument robust condence intervals add nothing new to the 2SLS and OLS
story. In addition, the midpoints of the intervals are all very close to 2SLS. In column 1, for instance, the
midpoint is roughly 0:045, which is above both OLS (0.016) and 2SLS (0.031) estimates. This pattern is
repeated in the remaining columns.
In sum, using OLS to address the economic impact of Internet use on corruption is not misleading in
the cross-country sample. However, OLS will likely provide conservative estimates as both 2SLS and the
midpoints of size-adjusted condence intervals are larger than the OLS estimate.
5.4.2 U.S. states
In the sample of U.S. states, the three di¤erent instruments relied upon are: INSTRUMENT 1, the cloud-
to-ground lightning density based on U.S. National Lightning Detection Network; INSTRUMENT 2, the
MBR-based lightning density of a state; and INSTRUMENT 3, the lightning density at the midpoint of the
state MBR.
Table 7 provides results. Inspecting Panel A, we see that the logic of the identication strategy also
holds in the U.S. sample: The lightning density is strongly and negatively related to the di¤usion of the
Internet across U.S. states. We again note that the choice of instrument is of little importance; results are
essentially unaltered moving from column 1 to column 3. Column 1, relying on ground-based lightning, is
two observations short, cf. Section 4.3. Columns 4 and 5 therefore reestimate columns 2 and 3 on this
reduced sample, with the alternative instruments, but with little change in results.
While Tables 6 and 7 are not directly comparable (due to di¤erences in corruption data), it is nevertheless
worth observing that the point estimate for lightning is numerically smaller in the U.S. sample, compared
to the cross-country sample. Taken at face value, this suggests that lightning has a smaller impact on
Internet di¤usion in the U.S., compared to across countries. The reason may be the following: In Section 3
50These condence intervals are weak-identication robust since information about the (partial) correlation between instru-
ments and the endogenous variable is not used.
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we noted that lightning in theory may impact on both marginal costs and marginal benets of IT capital.
However, since electrical outages and disturbances undoubtedly are of much shorter duration in the U.S.,
the marginal benet channel is quite possibly of secondary importance here. In poor countries, however, it
may be of substantial importance. This could explain the smaller marginal rst-stage impact of lightning
on DINTERNET in the U.S. sample, compared to the cross country sample.
- Table 7 about here -
We cannot reject the null of homoskedasticity. The rule-of-thumb is therefore informative, and since
F -values are always above ten, instruments are strong in all columns.
As in the cross-country sample, 2SLS yield results that are broadly consistent with OLS. DINTERNET
remains signicant at conventional levels. Testing the equality of OLS and 2SLS via the Hausman test does
not allow rejection of the null that DINTERNET is exogenous. We are thus led to conclude that valid
inferences can be drawn from OLS in the U.S. sample as well. Observe that in the U.S. sample OLS also
tends to produce smaller point estimates compared with 2SLS; OLS results therefore represent conservative
estimates of the impact from the spread of the Internet on changes in corruption.
5.5 Economic signicance
How large is the e¤ect of an increase in the number of Internet users on corruption? We will address this
question using our OLS estimates to remain conservative.
5.5.1 Cross country
In the cross-country sample we rely on the levels specication (2), i.e.
CCI2006 = 0 + 1DINTERNET + (2 + 1)CCI1991:
Using the results from OLS reported in column 2 of Table 2, the e¤ect of an increase in INTERNET2005
holding the initial level of Internet users constant will be considered. In this case, we have that
CCI2006 ' 1INTERNET2005: (8)
The typicalcountry in the cross-country sample is Morocco (CCI2006 =  0:060 and INTERNET2005 =
15:25). How would Moroccos corruption ranking change if we increase the number of Internet users in 2005
from the median to the third quartile of the world distribution? This amounts to increasing INTERNET
from 15 in one hundred to 35 in one hundred (i.e. to the level of Spain). Inserting in (8) gives CCI2006 '
(0:016)  20 = 0:32. That is, it would increase the CCI2006 score for Morocco from  0:060 to 0:26: Put
di¤erently, moving from the median to the third quartile in terms of Internet users would move the corruption
score from the median to roughly the 62nd percentile, which happens to be the level of Italy. While being
economically important, the e¤ect does not seem implausible large.
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5.5.2 U.S. states
In the U.S. sample we will also rely on the levels specication associated with (2), i.e.
log(1 + CC2006) = 0 + 1DINTERNET + (2 + 1) log(1 + CC1991):
If we linearize this levels specication, treating CC1991 as a constant, the following simple approximation
emerges:
CC2006 ' 1 (1 + CC2006) INTERNET2003; (9)
where we have used that for the U.S., DINTERNET = INTERNET2003, cf. Section 4.2.
We will consider the impact of changes in Internet use on corruption for the typical U.S. state.
The typical U.S. state in terms of corruption convictions and Internet use is Missouri (CC = 20 and
INTERNET2003 = 60:45). In a similar fashion as before, we may perform an experiment by which Missouri
is moved to the third quartile in the distribution of Internet users in 2003; this is equivalent to an increase of
exactly 4 Internet users per 100 people. Using the OLS results reported in column 2 in equation (9) we nd
CC2006 ' (1 + 20)  ( 0:06)  (4) =  5:04: That is, it would reduce the number of corruption convictions
(i.e. reduce the level of corruption) by roughly 5 yearly convictions. Put di¤erently, moving up eight places
in the ranking of Internet users (i.e. from the median to the third quartile) would move Missouri down three
places in the U.S. state corruption convictions ranking (i.e. from the 65th percentile to the 59th percentile
of the corruption convictions distribution in 2006).
5.6 Robustness
In this section we examine robustness of the cross-country results using an alternative corruption variable.
The ICRG corruption indicator (from the International Country Risk Guide) is intended to capture the
likelihood that high ranked o¢ cials in government will demand special payments, and in addition the extent
to which illegal payments are expected throughout government tiers (see Svensson, 2005). This indicator
allows us to go back to 1991, the launch date of the WWW. The ICRG corruption variable goes from zero
to 6; a higher score means less corruption.
Table 8 provides results. Note rst that the instrument is very strong, c.f. columns 3 and 4. In addition,
the Hausman test cannot detect any di¤erence between OLS and 2SLS results. Hence, qualitatively, no
results are altered using the ICRG corruption measure. Quantitatively, results also stay roughly the same
using ICRG as compared to using CCI. The typical country in terms of Internet use and corruption in the
large sample associated with column 1 is South Africa (INTERNET2005 = 10:88 and ICRG2005 = 2:17).
Increasing the number of Internet users in South Africa to the level of Malta, i.e. moving from the median
to the third quartile in the INTERNET2005 distribution, would move South Africa to the 68th percentile in
the corruption distribution (the level of Hungary), where we recall that higher scores means less corruption.
Consequently, cross-country results are robust to changes in corruption measure.
- Table 8 about here -
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6 Concluding remarks
The Internet is a powerful technology in the struggle to reduce corruption: it facilitates the dissemination of
information about corrupt behavior, thus making it more risky for bureaucrats and politicians to take bribes,
and it obviates the need for potentially corrupt o¢ cials to serve as middlemen between the government and
the public. In this paper, we provide evidence of this hypothesis by documenting that the spread of the
Internet has reduced corruption during its time in operation.
The correlation between changes in Internet penetration and changes in corruption, conditional on the
initial level of corruption, is strong and robust. It holds across the world at large, and across di¤erent sub-
samples of the world, using best available corruption perception indices as dependent variables. It also holds
across U.S. states, using corruption convictions. Moreover, in the U.S. sample the risk of omitted variable
bias tainting the OLS results is somewhat reduced, as this sample can be viewed as reasonable homogenous
in many respects.
Nevertheless, in order to examine whether Internet penetration has had a causal impact on corruption,
the paper develops a new instrument for the user cost of digital equipment such as computers, and thereby
for Internet di¤usion. Digital equipment is highly sensitive to power disruptions; and, to a considerable
extent, lightning activity causes power disruption around the world. Indeed, according to some calculations,
lightning causes some 17; 000 computers around the world to crash each second (Yeager and Stahlkopf, 2000).
Using global satellite data developed by NASA, and never used before in economic analysis, we construct
country and state level measures for average lightning density. Using cross-country data, we document that
lightning is highly correlated with electricity outages, and that the latter is associated with a slower pace
of Internet penetration. This motivates the use of lightning density as an instrument for Internet di¤usion.
Empirically, lightning density turns out to be a strong instrument for Internet di¤usion, especially in the
U.S. sample. Our 2SLS estimates conrm that the spread of the Internet has lowered corruption, both in
the U.S. and worldwide.
We are unable to reject that the spread of the Internet is exogenous in our specications, though OLS
estimates are considerably lower than the 2SLS counterparts. However, despite remaining conservative, by
using OLS estimates in our subsequent calculations, we nd the impact of the Internet on corruption to be
economically substantial. Accordingly, to the extent that corruption a¤ects economic growth, these ndings
provide one mechanism by which the Internet may work to spur growth. In this way, our ndings provide a
new perspective on the importance of the well-documented global digital divide.
The identication strategy developed in this paper may prove useful in future research. By providing a
strong instrument for Internet use, researchers may be able to make new progress on the impact of computers
and the Internet on other outcomes, like the return to education or productivity growth more broadly.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max
Panel A: Cross-country sample
CCI2006 113 0.105 -0.251 1.080 -1.767 2.573
CCI1996 113 0.112 -0.169 1.057 -2.084 2.297
INTERNET2005 113 22.56 15.24 21.66 0.208 86.94
INTERNET1996 113 1.541 0.196 3.216 0 18.26
GYCAP 106 0.272 0.191 0.294 -0.351 1.416
Average lightning density 113 8.530 5.309 8.328 0.021 40.13
Outages 93 27.5 9.6 46.6 0.04 248.96
Panel B: U.S. sample
CC2006 50 19.50 9 21.28 0 83
CC1991 50 12.94 5 20.85 0 108
INTERNET2003 50 60.10 59.80 6.055 42.60 71.55
GYCAP 50 0.356 0.354 0.064 0.170 0.580
Average lightning density 50 10.13 8.436 7.449 0.126 27.34
Notes: Average lightning density is the average ash rate density, calculated using the Minimum Bounding Rectangle
of the Optical Transient Detector-based 5-year total lightning variable.
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Table 2: Ordinary Least Squares on cross-country sample
Dependent variable: DCCI (1) (2) (3)
DINTERNET 0.016*** 0.016***
(0.004) (0.004)
CCI1996 -0.070** -0.287*** -0.291***
(0.028) (0.065) (0.066)
GYCAP 0.171
(0.141)
CONSTANT 0.001 -0.307*** -0.364***
(0.043) (0.087) (0.091)
Observations 113 113 106
R-squared 0.03 0.22 0.28
Notes: Dependent variable is the change in Control of Corruption, DCCI, over the period 1996 to 2006. The
explanatory variables are described in the main text. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks
***,**,* indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 3: Ordinary Least Squares on cross-country subsamples
Dependent variable: DCCI (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
DINTERNET 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.016**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
CCI1996 -0.235*** -0.285*** -0.286*** -0.275*** -0.339*** -0.301*** -0.291***
(0.064) (0.066) (0.065) (0.065) (0.063) (0.069) (0.106)
CONSTANT -0.221** -0.305*** -0.306*** -0.334*** -0.334*** -0.325*** -0.317**
(0.085) (0.088) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.099) (0.122)
Observations 91 112 110 100 100 90 75
Excluded region SSA NA SOA MENA EAP LAC ECA
R-squared 0.17 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.28 0.26 0.16
F-test 0.389 0.995 0.990 0.877 0.385 0.895 0.984
[H0: DINTERNET = 0.016, p-value]
Notes: Dependent variable is the change in Control of Corruption, DCCI, over the period 1996 to 2006.The ex-
planatory variables are described in the main text. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks
***, **, * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. The regional key is as follows: Sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA), North America (NA), South Asia (SOA), Middle East & North Africa (MENA), East Asia & Pacic
(EAP), Latin America & the Caribbean (LAC), Europe & Central Asia (ECA). The F-test tests the null that the
slope estimate of DINTERNET associated with each subsample is equal to the slope estimate associated with the
full sample, i.e. column 2 in Table 2.
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Table 4: Ordinary Least Squares on U.S. states
Dependent variable: DCC (1) (2) (3)
DINTERNET -0.061** -0.060**
(0.025) (0.025)
log(1+CC1991) -0.388*** -0.453*** -0.464***
(0.089) (0.088) (0.087)
GYCAP -1.131
(1.965)
CONSTANT 1.257*** 5.019*** 5.424***
(0.252) (1.541) (1.604)
Observations 50 50 50
R-squared 0.21 0.31 0.32
Notes: Dependent variable is the change in log(1+number of corruption convictions), DCC, over the period 1991 to
2006. The explanatory variables are described in the main text. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Asterisks ***,**,* indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 5: Zeroth Stage Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: log(OUTAGES) log(OUTAGES) DINTERNET DINTERNET DINTERNET
log(OUTAGES) -6.219*** -5.284*** -5.221***
(0.768) (1.007) (1.021)
LIGHTNING 0.537*** 0.385** -0.481
(0.162) (0.163) (1.330)
CCI1996 -0.701*** 5.001*** 4.759***
(0.193) (1.744) (1.998)
CONSTANT 1.162*** 1.126*** 28.04*** 26.79*** 27.48***
(0.358) (0.324) (2.139) (2.277) (3.090)
Observations 93 86 70 67 67
R-Squared 0.13 0.25 0.57 0.61 0.61
Notes: Dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the log of outages; the dependent variable in columns (3) to (5) is
the change in Internet use over the period 1996 to 2006. All variables are described in the main text. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks ***,**,* indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 6: Two-Stage Least Squares on cross-country sample
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: DINTERNET Panel A: First-stage regression
CCI1996 11.402*** 12.072*** 12.090***
(1.375) (1.307) (1.229)
INSTRUMENT 1 -3.353***
(1.222)
INSTRUMENT 2 -3.599***
(1.218)
INSTRUMENT 3 -3.633***
(1.276)
CONSTANT 24.912*** 26.180*** 26.437***
(2.469) (2.760) (2.892)
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test 0.018 0.018 0.019
[H0: constant error variance, p-value]
F (rst-stage) value 7.530 8.730 8.110
[H0: INSTRUMENT = 0]
Dependent variable: DCCI Panel B: Second-stage regression
DINTERNET 0.031** 0.032** 0.029**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011)
CCI1996 -0.496*** -0.504*** -0.469***
(0.184) (0.188) (0.165)
CONSTANT -0.602** -0.613** -0.564**
(0.244) (0.249) (0.226)
Observations 113 113 113
R-squared 0.04 0.03 0.08
Pagan-Hall test 0.864 0.612 0.913
[H0: constant error variance, p-value]
95% Chernozhukov-Hansen condence intervals for DINTERNET [0.006, 0.084] [0.007, 0.080] [0.005, 0.071]
Hausman test 0.317 0.338 0.411
[H0: DINTERNET is exogeneous, p-value]
Notes: Dependent variable is the change in Control of Corruption, DCCI; over the period 1996 to 2006. The
explanatory variables are described in the main text. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks
***,**,* indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Note: INSTRUMENT 1 is the MBR-based
average lightning density for a country, INSTRUMENT 2 is the lightning density in the capital of a country, and
INSTRUMENT 3 is the lightning density at the midpoint of the country MBR
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Table 7: Two-Stage Least Squares on U.S. sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: DINTERNET Panel A: First-stage regression
log(1+CC1991) -0.351 -0.566 -0.772 -0.569 -0.770
(0.605) (0.533) (0.487) (0.569) (0.510)
INSTRUMENT 1 -2.844***
(0.851)
INSTRUMENT 2 -2.340*** -3.201***
(0.845) (0.991)
INSTRUMENT 3 -3.486*** -4.195***
(1.199) (1.127)
CONSTANT 65.487*** 65.588*** 68.452*** 67.576*** 70.071***
(1.600) (1.786) (2.554) (2.065) (2.311)
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test 0.848 0.675 0.890 0.805 0.681
[H0: constant error variance, p-value]
F (rst-stage) value 13.53 10.89 12.82 13.51 15.76
[H0: INSTRUMENT = 0]
Dependent variable: DCC Panel B: Second-stage regression
DINTERNET -0.121*** -0.085* -0.085* -0.103** -0.090**
(0.043) (0.050) (0.045) (0.049) (0.044)
log(1+CC1991) -0.494*** -0.480*** -0.480*** -0.478*** -0.467***
(0.096) (0.097) (0.096) (0.096) (0.095)
CONSTANT 8.700*** 6.550** 6.547** 7.590** 6.825**
(2.688) (3.083) (2.818) (3.044) (2.723)
Observations 48 50 50 48 48
R-squared 0.23 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.30
Pagan-Hall test 0.532 0.443 0.449 0.511 0.479
[H0: constant error variance, p-value]
Hausman test 0.416 0.875 0.817 0.942 0.716
[H0: DINTERNET is exogeneous, p-value]
Notes: Dependent variable is the change in Control of Corruption, DCCI; over the period 1996 to 2006. The
explanatory variables are described in the main text. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks
***,**,* indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Note: INSTRUMENT 1, the cloud-to-ground
lightning density based on U.S. National Lightning Detection Network; INSTRUMENT 2, the MBR-based lightning
density of a state; and INSTRUMENT 3, the lightning density at the midpoint of the state MBR.
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Table 8: Robustness analysis on cross-country sample
Dependent variable: DICRG (1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS
INTERNET2005 0.036*** 0.031*** 0.043*** 0.042***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010)
ICRG1991 -0.747*** -0.654*** -0.811*** -0.780***
(0.088) (0.083) (0.109) (0.128)
GYCAP -0.038 -0.028
(0.216) (0.216)
CONSTANT 0.981*** 0.750*** 1.066*** 0.950***
(0.231) (0.204) (0.239) (0.261)
Observations 102 94 102 94
R-squared 0.57 0.48 0.56 0.45
F (rst-stage) value 20.94 18.25
[H0: INSTRUMENT = 0]
Hausman test 0.685 0.801
[H0: INTERNET is exogeneous, p-value]
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the ICRGs index over the period 1991 to 2005, DICRG. The
explanatory variables are described in the main text. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks
***, **, * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. The instrument used is the log of the MBR
based average lightning density.
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Figure 1: The gure shows the total number of Web sites on the Internet, 1990-2006. Generally,
the numbers refer to December 1st in the individual year. Source: Hobbes Internet Timeline v8.2
<http://www.zakon.org/robert/internet/timeline/>.
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Figure 2: The gure shows Control of Corruption in 1996 (horizontal axis) versus Control of Corruption in
2006 (vertical axis). The full line is the 45-degree line. The sample used is the largest estimation sample
used in the empirical analysis below. The number of observations is 117.
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Figure 3: The gure shows a scatter plot of log(1 + corruption convictions in 1991) (horizontal axis) versus
log(1 + corruption convictions in 2006) (vertical axis). The full line is the 45-degree line. Number of
observations is 50.
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Figure 4: Average ash density (ashes per year per km2). The gure is constructed using the OTD Global
Lightning Distributions for the period April 12, 1995 to December 31, 1999.
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Figure 5: The gure shows a scatter plot of total lightning ash rate density (ashes per km2 per year)
based on the Optical Transient Detector high resolution data (horizontal axis) versus cloud-to-ground ash
rate density (ashes per km2 per year) based on the U.S. National Lightning Detection Network (vertical
axis). The full line is the 45-degree line. Number of observations is 48.
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Figure 6: The gure shows the relationship between average lightning density and electrical outages once
the inuence of corruption in 1996 is partialled out.
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Figure 7: The gure shows the relationship between electrical outages and changes in Internet use once the
inuence of corruption in 1996 is partialled out.
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